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When Nations Kill: The Liu Case and
the Act of State Doctrine in
Wrongful Death Suits
By FLETCHER ALFORD
Member of the Class of 1989
The United States judiciary has long struggled to define its proper
role in the conduct of foreign affairs. The courts face this quandary in
part because the Constitution does not explicitly define their foreign pol-
icy function. In the area of foreign affairs-perhaps more so than in any
other function of government-one encounters what Justice Jackson
termed a "zone of twilight" in which the constitutional distribution of
federal power is in some respects uncertain.' And since Congress has
been reluctant to statutorily delineate the courts' jurisdiction over for-
eign affairs matters, the judiciary has been left largely to its own devices
in charting such limits.
In response to this uncertainty, the federal courts have developed
the act of state doctrine.2 In essence, the doctrine is an admonition to
the courts that they should voluntarily decline to exercise jurisdiction
over cases that necessitate a determination of the legality or propriety of
a foreign government's act. It is thus a policy of judicial self-restraint in
the area of foreign affairs. However, the doctrine is not without its
difficulties.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
2. The act of state doctrine is a creation of the courts and is a matter of "federal common
law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 469 comment c. (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985] (noting that the act of state doctrine is a creation of the courts); Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-27 (1964). In Sabbatino the Court noted that the act of state
doctrine is "an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of
the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of
the international community (and thus) must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal
law." Id. at 425. The Court held that the problems involved in this context are "intrinsically
federal," and thus that the rule laid down in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938) is inapplicable to act of state cases. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426-27. See generally Ed-
wards, The Erie Doctrine in Foreign Affairs Cases, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 674 (1967); J. COUND, 3.
FRIEDENTHAL, A. MILLER & J. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE 364-78 (1985).
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This Note considers the development of the act of state doctrine and
its raison d'etre. Particular consideration will be given to the application
of the doctrine in cases of tortious conduct by a foreign sovereign causing
personal injury or death. In the recent case of Liu v. Republic of China3
a United States district court held that the act of state doctrine immu-
nized such sovereign conduct. This is the first time in this century that a
court has applied the act of state doctrine to shield a foreign government
from liability for personal injury or death. This Note argues that the act
of state doctrine has no proper application to cases involving intentional
torts against the person. The Liu case is thus an ill-founded extension of
the doctrine and should be reversed.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE DOCTRINE
The classic statement of the act of state doctrine is set forth in the
early case of Underhill v. Hernandez:4 "Every sovereign state is bound to
respect the independence of every other sovereign state, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory."5
3. No. C-85-7461, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987) (order denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and granting motion to dismiss as to Republic of China).
4. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
5. Id. at 252. However, this rather straightforward and unproblematic definition belles
the complexity of the issues which regularly arise in act of state cases. When exactly does a
court of one country "sit in judgement" on the acts of another? Is a governmental act "done"
within that sovereign's own territory if its full realization requires -the cooperation or obeisance
of another sovereign? If "every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state," is the act of state doctrine then a matter of international law which all
governments are compelled to apply? In answering these questions, the Underhill statement
serves as little more than a starting point.
A somewhat more helpful definition of the doctrine can be found in the Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law: Courts of the United States should decline to hear cases which would
require them to rule on the legality of an act of a foreign sovereign, through which act the
sovereign has "exercised its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STA.ES § 41 (1965) [hereinafter
1965 R rATEMENT]. Cf. Tent. Draft No. 6 (1987) (proposing the language "acts of a gov-
ernmental character" in place of "acts through which the sovereign has exercised its jurisdic-
tion to give effect to its public interests").
The benefits of the Restatement definition are twofold. First, it abandons the notion ex-
pressed in Underhill that application of the act of state doctrine is compelled by the very
nature of sovereign authority, thus making clear that the doctrine is a matter of United States
law not binding on foreign courts. See infra notes 11, 16, 17 and accompanying text, "Every
sovereign state" is not "bound" by the act of state doctrine; rather, the doctrine is an admoni-
tion to United States courts. Second, the Restatement definition makes clear that not all acts
of foreign sovereigns are immune from scrutiny in United States courts. Only those acts
through which the sovereign has attempted to "give effect to its public interests" are immune
from scrutiny. See infra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
[Vol, 12
Act of State Doctrine in Wrongful Death Suits
Thus when the plaintiff asserts a claim that would require the court
to rule on the legality of a qualifying "act of state," the defendant may
raise the act of state doctrine as an affirmative defense.6 If the doctrine is
successfully asserted by the defendant,' the court will deem "nonjusticia-
ble" the relevant act of state. Since the particular act of state is usually
central to the plaintiff's case, dismissal of the action is typically appropri-
ate. Although similar in effect to a dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, a dismissal on act of state grounds is not a ruling that the
court lacks jurisdiction over the case.'
A. Traditional Basis of the Doctrine: Sovereignty
Although the act of state doctrine has a long history of application
by the courts and is "firmly entrenched in U.S. jurisprudence," 9 much of
this case law has done more to obfuscate than to elucidate the legal and
policy bases of the doctrine. This is a critical error since the applicability
of the doctrine, particularly in questionable cases, should be determined
in light of its underlying policies.10 Thus, as in the Liu case, the failure
of some courts to correctly identify the policy rationale embodied in the
act of state doctrine results in its misapplication.
Recent cases recognize that the doctrine is a product of domestic,
not international law. 1 More specifically, the doctrine may be viewed as
6. V. NANDA & D. PANsius, LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DisPums IN U.S.
CouRTs ch. 8, at 13 (1986) (categorizing the act of state doctrine as an affirmative defense).
7. As an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of proving an act of state.
RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment c; see generally W.
PROSSER, W. KEETON, D. DOMnS, R. KEETON & D. OwEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
TORTs 108 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. PROSSER].
8. Not infrequently, cases involving acts of foreign governments will raise both jurisdic-
tional issues and the act of state doctrine. However, despite this common conjunction, the two
are conceptually distinguishable. The act of state doctrine "is not a jurisdictional doctrine but
a rule of substantive law. The court has jurisdiction over the case, but chooses not to exercise
such jurisdiction because of act of state considerations." V. NANDA & D. PANslus, supra note
6, ch. 8, at 13 & ch. 10, at 3; see also International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No.
6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment a.
This can be distinguished from the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L No. 94-
583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c), 1332 (a)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11
(1976)), which establishes limitations on the jurisdiction of United States courts to adjudicate
the rights of foreign governments. If the court does not have jurisdiction over the case, act of
state considerations will not be reached.
9. V. NANDA & D. PANsIus, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 7. The doctrine has been employed
by Anglo courts, in one form or another, since as early as the seventeenth century. See, e-g.,
Bad v. Banifield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Kb. 1674).
10. R.STATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment b.
11. See, eg., Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421 (1964) ("[Ihe
19891
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a function of United States choice of law considerations: 2 The dismissal
of a case on act of state grounds is essentially a finding by the court that
the law of the foreign sovereign should be the rule of decision, whereas a
holding not to dismiss on act of state grounds constitutes a determination
that United States law should govern the controversy.
However, there is substantial disagreement as to the policy consider-
ations which underlie this determination. According to one view, appli-
cation of the act of state doctrine is compelled by the very nature of
sovereign authority. Under this analysis the doctrine is seen as an out-
growth of the concept of foreign sovereign immunity, and the two are
thought to share a common rationale. But this is where the view fails-
for, as we have seen, the act of state doctrine and foreign sovereign im-
munity do not share common roots. Foreign sovereign immunity is a
jurisdictionally-based issue,1 3 while the act of state doctrine is a rule of
substantive law not involving jurisdiction.14 Fortunately, this explication
of the doctrine usually appears in the older case law,15 and is now widely
rejected in modern case law16 and commentary. 7
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law takes the position that,
while not compelled by the very nature of foreign sovereignty, the pur-
pose of. the doctrine is "essentially to avoid disrespect for foreign
states."18
The Restatement position and the "inherent nature of sovereignty"
view share a common flaw. Application of the act of state doctrine is not
compelled by international law; rather, the doctrine is a matter of the
public law of nations can hardly dictate to a country which is in theory wronged how to treat
that wrong within its domestic borders."). Id. at 423.
12. See, eg., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 438 ("Since the act of state doctrine reflects the
desirability of presuming the [act of state] valid... the forum may not apply its local law
regarding [that act.] .. ."); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682,
726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he act of state doctrine merely tells a court what law
to apply to a case.... ").
13. REsTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment a; see DeR-
oburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 702 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985).
14. RFSTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment a; see V.
NANDA & D. PANsIus, supra note 6, ch. 8, at 13, & ch. 10, at 3; International Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) ("Every sovereign state is
bound to respect the independence of every other Sovereign State .... "); American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
16. See, eg., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421 ("We do not believe that this doctrine is com-
pelled ... by the inherent nature of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem
to imply. ... ").
17. See, e.g., V. NANDA & D. PANsIus, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 14.
18. REsTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469, comment a.
[Vol, 12
Act of State Doctrine in Wrongful Death Suits
domestic law of the United States. 19 One country "can hardly dictate to
[another] country which is in theory wronged how to treat that wrong
within its domestic borders."'2 Therefore, since each nation has the
power to decide how it will adjudicate acts of foreign states in its courts,
the act of state doctrine can hardly be compelled by the inherent nature
of sovereignty. And since international law leaves foreign sovereigns free
to adjudicate acts of the United States government in their courts if they
choose to do so, it is hardly "disrespectful" for United States courts to
likewise review the acts of foreign governments.
The flaw of both the Restatement and the "inherent nature of sover-
eignty" views, then, is their common failure to analyze the act of state
doctrine as a matter of domestic law.
B. Modern Approach To The Doctrine: Separation of Powers
The Supreme Court in its most recent decisions has given credence
to yet another justification for continued application of the act of state
doctrine. This view is perhaps the most plausible, given the act of state
doctrine's roots in domestic law. Under this rationale the doctrine is
seen as a function of the distribution of federal power; our constitutional
system of separated powers establishes the president-not the courts-as
the primary organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations.2" The act of state doctrine counsels the courts not to adjudi-
cate cases that would interfere with the executive branch's handling of
foreign affairs.22
This is not to imply that the act of state doctrine is mandated by the
Constitution. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has unequivocally re-
jected the view that "every case or controversy which touches foreign
19. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
20. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
21. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). Compare
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 287 (1987-88) ("[T]he
constitutional blueprint for the governance of our foreign affairs has proved to be starkly in-
complete, indeed skimpy.").
22. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.
38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982) ("Act of state analysis depends upon a
careful case-by-case analysis of the extent to which the separation of powers concerns on which
the doctrine is based are implicated by the action before the court."); First National City Bank
v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775 (1972) (Powell, 3., concurring); Octjen v. Cen-
tral Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign relations of our Gov-
ernment is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative--'the political'-
Departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.").
1989]
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relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."23  Indeed there is ample pre-
cedent, dating back to this nation's early history, for judicial review of
the acts of foreign governments.24
Thus the courts in modern act of state cases have recognized that
the doctrine is not "compelled" by the text of the Constitution. 25 Yet, it
is said to have "constitutional underpinnings." 26 These underpinnings
"arise out of the basic relationships between the branches of government
in a system of separation of powers."'27 Simply put, the Constitution does
not strictly require application of the act of state doctrine. Rather, that
document establishes a system of government under which the executive,
not the judiciary, is the primary actor in the field of foreign relations.
Prudence, then, counsels the need for self-imposed limitations upon
judicial involvement in a field dominated by the executive branch. Judi-
cial adjudication of controversies involving acts of state may well "seri-
ously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the executive branch
[with the acting state]....
Several problems are posed by such judicial interference. Perhaps
foremost among these is the concern that adjudication of act of state
cases may embarrass the executive branch before the international com-
munity. The courts have recognized "the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
23. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Rose v. Himley, 8 U.S. 241 (1808).
25. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1534 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) ("Separation of powers concerns are the
underpinnings of the act of state doctrine.").
28. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432. The president regularly negotiates with foreign govern-
ments for the settlement of claims asserted against those governments by United States nation-
als. Such settlements may be memorialized in an executive agreement, having the force and
effect of law. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). This appears to be a
common and well-established practice: from 1817-1917, over 80 such agreements were entered
into by United States presidents seeking to settle the foreign claims of American citizens,
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 (1981) (citing W. MCCLURE, INTERNA-
TIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 53 (1941)). In the last 30 yeats alone, United States presi-
dents have entered into at least 10 claim settlement agreements with foreign nations, including
one in the amount of $80 million. Id. at 680. See also, Henkin, supra note 21, at 291 ("[T]he
practice of the president acting ... to make informal agreements was inevitable and began
early.").
In Dames & Moore the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this practice, noting
that "Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agree-
ment." 453 U.S. at 680; see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 ("Power to ... [effect] settlement of
claims of our nationals ... certainly is a modest implied power of the President."); Accord
1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 213 (The Pregident "may waive or settle a claim
against a foreign state....").
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tion."29 The opportunity for such embarrassment is particularly acute
should United States courts adjudicate a case involving an international
dispute which is then the subject of State Department negotiation. A
court decision inconsistent with expressed State Department policy
would frustrate the "unity of design"3 so crucial in the international
arena, and the executive's diplomatic position would doubtless be im-
paired. It is this very embarrassment that the act of state doctrine at-
tempts to prevent.3 '
Beyond mere embarrassment, however, is the recognition that
courts are ill-suited to adjudicate cases laden with foreign policy issues.
The act of state doctrine thus "concerns the competency of dissimilar
institutions to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the
area of international relations. 32
Through the doctrine the courts have taken judicial notice of the
fact that the "political" branches-particularly the executive-are better
equipped than the judiciary to resolve politically sensitive international
disputes.33 While the judiciary focuses on the immediate dispute before
the court, the executive is better "able to consider the competing...
political considerations and respond to the public will in accordance with
the best interests of the country as a whole."'34
Also, insofar as the typical act of state (e.g., property expropriation
by a foreign sovereign) adversely affects many potential plaintiffs, judicial
resolution of the matter through piecemeal litigation would be less likely
to protect the rights of all potential plaintiffs than would resolution of the
matter en masse through diplomatic channels.35 In the latter instance,
the rights of all injured United States parties can be represented simulta-
neously by the State Department.
Even if in a particular case a court could join all the plaintiffs to-
gether in one proceeding against a foreign state, additional obstacles
would remain which are also better surmounted by the executive branch.
Act of state cases often entail "the sensitive task of establishing a princi-
ple not inconsistent with the national interest or with international jus-
29. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
30. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
31. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 433. For a discussion of the embarrassment theory rationale
for the act of state doctrine, see V. NANDA & D. PANsius, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 43.
32. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423.
33. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981), cer.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
34. Id
35. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431-32; V. NANDA & D. PANsius, supra note 6, oh. 10, at
13, 14, 24, 25.
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tice."36 To be surmounted most effectively, such a task requires that the
decision-maker have access to the sort of information-gathering sources
which provide the factual bases for foreign policy decisions. "[The exec-
utive branch] must necessarily be most competent to determine when,
how, and upon what subjects negotiations may be urged with the greatest
prospect of success ... [since that branch] has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries." 37 The State
Department has confidential sources of information and diplomatic, con-
sular, and other officials upon which to draw. However, the judiciary
lacks such resources.
Even if the court in a particular case had the resources sufficient to
reach an equitable decision, it would still face the problem of enforcing
its decision against the foreign sovereign. By the time an act of state
dispute reaches the litigation stage, the court is typically faced with afait
accompli by the foreign state-since the disputed res is usually within
that sovereign's territorial control.38 Thus even if the court were compe-
tent to reach an equitable decision in the case, it would likely be power-
less to enforce that decision.3 9 The executive branch, however, has a
wide range of diplomatic and other foreign policy options at its disposal
to exert considerable pressure on the foreign state.
In short, the act of state doctrine is best seen as based upon the
separation of powers within the federal government, rather than upon
antiquated notions of territoriality or the inherent nature of sovereign
authority. This view is most consistent with the approach taken by the
36. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
37. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936). See also
Henkin, supra note 28, at 307 ("The President represents needs for expertise, secrecy, speed,
efficiency.").
38. In determining whether to apply the act of state doctrine in any given case, courts
have considered whether the sovereign was in a position to perform a fait accompli in the
situation. See, eg., Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715
(5th Cir. 1968) ("The underlying thought expressed in all of the cases touching on the act of
state doctrine is a common-sense one. It is that when a foreign government performs an act of
state which is an accomplished fact, that is when it has the parties and the res before it and acts
in such a manner as to change the relationship between the parties touching the res ... there
[is] nothing the United States Courts [can] do about it in any event.") (emphasis added), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968).
39. Id. For arguments that the act of state doctrine should apply only to those cases In
which United States courts would be powerless to enforce their decisions, see Note, Rlehablllta.
tion and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L LAW AND POL. 599, 650
(1979-80) ("[The act of state doctrine] should apply only... where [the foreign] state has the
power to make its act an accomplished fact."); V. NANDA & D. PANSIUS, supra note 6, ch, 10,
at 3, 13-14, 24, 25, 38 (arguing that the act of state doctrine should apply only where a United
States court would be unable to enforce an effective remedy).
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modem act of state cases."
Given the act of state doctrine's roots in domestic law, it is more
reasonable to view the doctrine as concerned with ordering the relation-
ships between functions of the branches of our federal government,
rather than as concerned with respect for foreign nations qua sovereigns.
Under this view the doctrine is a common sense one, recognizing that
under our constitutional system of government the executive branch has
access to resources superior to those of the courts in making and enforc-
ing decisions which determine the liabilities of foreign governments.
If the above view of the act of state doctrine is correct, then the
doctrine is essentially a specialized application of the familiar political
question doctrine.4' Like the act of state doctrine, the political question
doctrine is "primarily a function of the separation of powers."' 2
Given this common basis, then, whether or not a case should be
dismissed pursuant to the act of state doctrine ought to be determined
according to the political question test. A political question analysis en-
compasses the following considerations:
[Is there a] lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding [the case] without an
initial policy determination... or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government.., or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.43
40. See, eg., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
First National City Bank v. Banco National de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Texas Trading and
Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). Cf. Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. at 427-28. (The "continuing vitality [of the act of state doctrine] depends on its
capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political
branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs."); but see Note, supra
note 39, at 599 (arguing that the act of state doctrine is rooted in the concept of sovereign
immunity, rather than separation of powers).
41. For analyses of the act of state doctrine based on domestic political question stan-
dards, see. eg. First National City Bank, 406 U.S. at 787-88 (Brennan J., dissenting); Northrop
Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that the act
of state doctrine is essentially the foreign counterpart to the domestic political question doc-
trine), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983); RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2,
at § 469 comment a; see generally Note, Adjudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign
Sovereign." A Political Question Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722 (1983).
42. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
43. Id. at 217.
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This test adequately reflects the concerns which underlie the act of state
doctrine, and is essentially the standard which the Supreme Court ap-
plied in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino and post-Sabbatino cases.'
II. THE LIU CASE: A MISAPPLICATION OF THE ACT
OF STATE DOCTRINE
The case of Liu v. Republic of China45 strikingly illustrates a court's
failure to appreciate the act of state doctrine's basis in the separation of
powers, resulting in a misapplication of the doctrine. Furthermore, the
Liu case is unique as an act of state case in that it was a suit for wrongful
death. Most cases applying the act of state doctrine have either involved
some form of property confiscation by the foreign sovereign 46 or have
arisen in the context of international business transactions. 47
Henry Liu, the decedent in this case, was born in mainland China,
but fled with his family to the island of Taiwan in 1949.4' Seeking
greater freedom to write and speak his views, Liu left Taiwan in 1967 and
moved to the United States. 49 He settled in the San Francisco area,
where he wrote for a leftist Chinatown newspaper, the San Francisco
Journal.0 Liu had also written a critical biography of the late Chiang
Ching-Kuo, then Taiwan's president. Banned in Taiwan, the book was
nevertheless widely smuggled into that country. The Taiwanese govern-
ment also attempted to block its publication in the United States. 1 At
the time of his death Liu was preparing to publish two more books, both
of which reportedly were to reveal information embarrassing to the
44. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); First
National City Bank, 406 U.S. 759.
45. No. C-85-7461, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987) (order denying plaintiff's motion
for summary judgement and granting motion to dismiss as to Republic of China).
46. E.g., First National City Bank, 406 U.S. 759; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949), modi-
fied, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
47. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. V.
Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032
(1985).
48. Slain Author's Desire for Good Life in Taiwan Led to Death, Wife Says, San Francisco
Examiner, Nov. 4, 1984, at B2, col. 1.
49. Id.
50. Bay Journalist's Shooting Death May Be Political, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 17,
1984, at 2, col. 1.
51. Slain Author's Desire for Good Life in Taiwan Led to Death, Wife Says, supra note 48,
at B2, col. 1.
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Taiwanese government 52 -and particularly damaging to Admiral Wong
Hsi-Ling, director of Taiwan's Defense Intelligence Bureau. 3
On October 15, 1984, Liu was shot to death by two gunmen at his
home in Daly City, California.54 The murder and subsequent legal ac-
tion received extensive media coverage, and it was widely speculated that
the assassins were acting as agents of the Taiwanese government ss Tai-
wan initially denied any connection with the killing and offered its gov-
ernment's assistance in the investigation. 6
However, a subsequent investigation conducted by Taiwanese tribu-
nals found Admiral Wong and several of his subordinates in the Defense
Intelligence Bureau guilty of conspiring to murder Liu.5 7 Wong was sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.51 The Taiwanese court also found-and
this is crucial-that Admiral Wong had entirely concealed the murder
plot from his superiors in the Taiwanese government. The court deter-
mined that he had acted solely in his individual capacity while directing
the murder, and without the knowledge or approval of higher govern-
ment officials.59 The Taiwanese court also noted that murder violates the
official policy and law of the government of Taiwan, and therefore that
Wong had acted without any authority or approval of the Taiwanese
government.6°
This finding was controverted by Tung Kuei-sen. A triggerman in
the Liu murder, Tung was extradited from Brazil and tried in the United
States for the murder.61 At his trial Tung asserted that he was deluded
by high-ranking officials in the Taiwanese government, who allegedly
52. Id.
53. Liu v. Republic of China, No. C-85-7461, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987).
54. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (order denying
motion to dismiss).
55. See, e.g., Daly City Man Shot to Death, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 16, 1984, at 44,
col. 1; see supra notes 48-50; Treen, Taiwan Sorting the Suspects in a Political Murder, NEws-
WEEK, Jan. 28, 1985, at 38; Taiwanese Ordered to Trial in Writer's California Killing, N.Y.
Times, June 13, 1987, § 1, at 44, col. 4; Taiwan Dropped From Liu Death Suit, LA. Tnnes,
Aug. 28, 1987, § 1, at 40, col. 6.
56. Taiwanese Deny Role in Writer's Death, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 20, 1984, at 12,
col. 5.
57. Liu, (No. C-85-7461) at 5. The courts found that Wong arranged to have the murder
carried out by certain members of Taiwan's "Bamboo Union," an organized crime syndicate.
Id. Wong and the Defense Intelligence Bureau also supplied Bamboo Union members with
money and training in preparation for the murder. Id.
58. Taiwan: Island of Quiet Anxiety, TIME, Sept. 16, 1985, at 46.
59. Liu, (No. C-85-7461) at 2, 6.
60. Id. at 5-6.
61. Jury Convicts Tiggerman in Henry Liu Assassination, San Francisco Examiner,
March 17, 1988, at A-1, col.1.
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convinced him that Liu was "a traitor" and that the assassination would
be "a great contribution to the country."62
Upon returning to Taiwan after the murder, Tung and his accom-
plice reportedly were greeted by top-ranking officials in Taiwan's Defense
Intelligence Bureau, who praised them for carrying out the assassination.
Tung claims to have been assured that even higher ranking government
officials-including Chiang Shiao-wa, son of Tadwan's then-president
Chiang Ching-Kuo-were "very pleased" with his deed.63 After having
expressed reservations about his role in the murder, Tung alleges, he nar-
rowly escaped a government hit-team sent to silence him.64 "The mur-
der," he said in his closing statement to the jury, "was an act of the
Taiwan government." 65
Helen Liu, Henry Liu's widow, brought a wrongful death suit in the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California. She
named as defendants both the government of Taiwan, as well as certain
individual government personnel, including Wong. In this suit the plain-
tiff claimed that the government of Taiwan was responsible for her hus-
band's death because, she said, the murder was the product of a
conspiracy involving the highest reaches of that government.66 In es-
sence, her claim is that the murder was an official act of the Taiwanese
government. 67 She further contends that the Taiwanese court's investi-
gation into the murder was a mere "pseudo-trial" and "orchestrated...
to conceal [the government's] responsibility....
The district court, however, applied the act of state doctrine to dis-
miss the defendant government of Taiwan from the litigation. 9 The
plaintiff has appealed.70
A. The Liu Court's Rationale
In order to understand the Liu decision, one must note that it was
the finding of the Taiwanese court which was deemed an act of state-
not the actual murder itself. At an earlier stage of the Liu litigation,
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. On March 16, 1988, after barely 45 minutes of deliberation, a San Matco County,
California, jury found Tung guilty of first degree murder. Id.
66. Liu v. Republic of China No. C-85-7461 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987).
67. Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 299 (N.D. Cal. 1986), (order denying
motion to dismiss).
68. Liu, (No. C-85-7461) at 2.
69. Id. at 20.
70. Liu v. Republic of China, appeal docketed, No. 87-2976 (9th Cir. pending).
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Judge Lynch (author of the Liu opinion) indicated that he would dismiss
Taiwan from the litigation if it became apparent that "a finding of liabil-
ity on the part of [Taiwan] would necessarily involve findings inconsistent
with those made by the courts of [Taiwan] .... "71 At that time the
court declined to dismiss Taiwan from the litigation because of the possi-
bility that the plaintiff could prevail against that government under a
theory of respondeat superior.72 A respondeat superior theory would not
require the plaintiff to prove any direct involvement of the Taiwanese
government in the murder. She would then have no occasion to deny the
validity of the Taiwanese court's findings (to the effect that the govern-
ment was not involved in the murder) and would thus potentially avoid
running afoul of the act of state doctrine. In other words, the act of
state doctrine would not require dismissal of a respondeat superior claim
against Taiwan because such a claim would not need to establish the
direct culpability of the Taiwanese government. Consequently, it would
not be necessary to question the validity of the Taiwanese court's finding
that the government was not involved in the murder.
Judge Lynch then provided the plaintiff with an opportunity to pres-
ent a respondeat superior case against Taiwan which would not challenge
the accuracy of the Taiwanese court's findings. However, he subse-
quently held that the plaintiff had not established the respondeat superior
liability of Taiwan, since Admiral Wong's act of conspiring to commit
murder was not within the "course and scope" of his duties as an em-
ployee of the Taiwanese government.73
With the respondeat superior theory unavailable, the plaintiff could
prevail against Taiwan only by showing that the government was itself
actually involved in the murder plot, contrary to the findings of the
Taiwanese courts. "[I]n order to hold [Taiwan] liable, plaintiff must go
beyond the [Taiwanese Court's] findings and in fact contradict those
findings."'74 Therefore, at this juncture the court was faced squarely with
the applicability of the act of state doctrine: Does that doctrine preclude
United States courts from entertaining a suit in which the plaintiff must
controvert the findings of a foreign court?
Judge Lynch answered that question in the affirmative. He held that
the Taiwanese court proceeding was "not an ordinary adjudication...
[but rather, it was] an effort by the ROC [Republic of China/Taiwan] to
determine the facts about and assess responsibility for a matter of grave
71. Liu, 642 F.Supp. at 302 (order denying motion to dismiss) (emphasis in original).
72. IdL at 303.
73. Liu, (No. C-85-7461) at 9.
74. Id. at 11-12.
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concern to the ROC people."" Since the court proceeding was an exer-
cise of Taiwan's jurisdiction in order to give effect to its public interests,
it is a protected act of state.76 Since plaintiff's claim necessarily sought
to declare invalid this act of state, her claim was dismissed."
The court also noted that the plaintiff proposed discovery which
would intrude into sensitive, high-level areas of the Taiwanese govern-
ment. Judge Lynch held that this discovery also would be barred by the
act of state doctrine,7" since that doctrine "precludes such an inquiry into
the most sensitive areas of a foreign nation's national security and intelli-
gence affairs. . ,7
B. Criticism of the Liu Decision
Insofar as the act of state doctrine denies the plaintiff access to the
judicial system, it should be applied narrowly. The doctrine should not
be employed unless its application to the immediate case before the court
substantially furthers the policies which the doctrine is intended to pro-
mote.8" As will be demonstrated below, Liu is not such a case.
The Liu decision represents a grievous misapplication of the act of
state doctrine. The Liu court failed to recognize that the doctrine is
based on the federal system of separated powers, as Sabbatino and its
progeny make clear. This misunderstanding of the doctrine's basis trans-
lates into an inability of the court to appreciate its limited applicability.
Obsessed by the desire to avoid offending a foreign sovereign, the court
reads the act of state doctrine as demanding virtually unlimited judicial
deference to the acts of foreign governments. However, the doctrine
counsels deference to the executive branch of the United States govern-
ment-not to the foreign sovereign. When the doctrine is viewed in this
light, its misapplication by the Liu court becomes manifest.
An exploration of the entire array of limitations to the act of state
doctrine is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, the following sections
75. Id. at 15.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 19-20.
78. Id. at 18.
79. Id. at 19.
80. Texas Trading and Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 318
n.38 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Act of state analysis depends upon a careful case-by-case analysis of tho
extent to which the separation of powers concerns on which the doctrine is based are impli.
cated by the action before the court ...." The doctrine should not be applied to a case which
"does not seriously implicate the relevant policy considerations."). Cf. International Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982)
("The decision to deny access to judicial relief is not one we make lightly.").
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will explore those specific boundaries of the doctrine that necessitate a
reversal of the Liu decision.
1. The Liu Court Ignored the Special Policy Concerns Present
in Personal Injury Cases
Although the doctrine is not theoretically limited to cases involving
expropriation of property by foreign sovereigns, in practice the modem
trend has been to confine the doctrine to such cases. Apparently desiring
not to set a broad precedent, the Supreme Court in the landmark Sabba-
tino case explicitly confined its holding to acts of state involving property
seizure by foreign sovereigns."1 Indeed, many commentators have ar-
gued that the doctrine has no proper application beyond such cases.82
Therefore, the doctrine's applicability should be particularly suspect
as to those cases in which the plaintiff suffers physical harm due to the
alleged intentional tortious misconduct of a foreign government. Such
cases present special policy concerns, which argue against application of
the act of state doctrine. It has been said that "[n]o wrong stands out
with greater distinctness from other torts than does that in which dam-
age is directly done by force." 3 The "highly obnoxious character"" of
violent torts has long been recognized by the common law, which treated
such conduct as a form of action-trespass--distinct from negligent
harm.85 This form of action had a criminal character.86 By providing
for punitive damages in such cases, modem tort law recognizes society's
interest not only in making the plaintiff whole, but also in punishing the
intentional tortfeasor and deterring future such conduct.8 7
The Supreme Court has clearly eschewed an "inflexible and all-en-
compassing rule" which would require automatic deference to the acts of
81. 376 U.S. at 428 ("[RIather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-en-
compassing rule... we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a
taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign... .") (emphasis added).
Indeed, subsequent to Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897), the Supreme Court has
not applied the act of state doctrine to cases involving more than "mere" property takings by
foreign sovereigns.
82. See, ag., RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment a;
Note, supra note 39, at 599. The doctrine appears to have developed largely in the context of
property seizure cases. See First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
83. 1 T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY: TORTS 2 (1906).
84. Id. at 1.
85. 1 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW 5 (superceded, 1977).
86. 1 T. STREET, supra note 83, at 1-2.
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 9.
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foreign governments.88 Rather, the Court views the act of state doctrine
as a "flexible rule,"' s9 the applicability of which should be judged by "the
balance of relevant considerations." 90 The "highly obnoxious character"
of murder is surely such a "relevant consideration."
In this balance, the social policy concerns which exist in intentional
tort cases such as Liu weigh heavily against application of the act of state
doctrine to dismiss a plaintiff's claim. However, the Liu court was un-
moved by such considerations. Indeed, there is no evidence in the opin-
ion that Judge Lynch even examined "the balance of relevant
considerations," as Sabbatino instructs.
Giving the Liu court the benefit of the doubt in the above argument,
we have not assumed that the act of state doctrine is categorically inap-
plicable to cases involving intentional torts against the person. However,
there is evidence that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to so apply
the doctrine today. Not since the 1897 case of Underhill v. Hernandez91
has the Supreme Court applied the act of state doctrine beyond instances
of "mere" property expropriation by a foreign sovereign.
a. Underhill
The Underhill case arose out of the forcible detention in Venezuela
of Mr. Underhill. Underhill, a United States citizen, was constructing a
public waterworks system in the city of Ciudad Bolivar, Venezuela, when
that government experienced a coup d'etat. When Underhill attempted
to flee the country, he was denied an exit visa. General Hernandez, exer-
cising military control over the city, ordered Underhill confined within
the city limits until the waterworks project was completed. Two months
later, when the project had been completed, Underhill was released. In a
subsequent suit in a United States court, Underhill was denied a remedy.
The Court held that his detention was a protected act of state, which
United States courts could not question.
Even assuming that Underhill is still good law today-which is
questionable given that the Court has not similarly applied the act of
state doctrine in the intervening 100 years-the Liu facts are clearly dis-
tinguishable. Most significantly, the tortious act giving rise to suit in
Underhill occurred within the territory of the foreign sovereign, while in
Liu the murder occurred in the United States. This distinction is of great
significance in act of state cases. Furthermore, Mr. Underhill, though
88. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
89. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972).
90. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
91. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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temporarily deprived of his freedom to travel, walked away unscathed
from the act of state in question. By contrast, Henry Liu was brutally
murdered.
The above distinctions, in the "balance of relevant considerations,"
should certainly weigh against dismissal of plaintiff's claim in Liu.
b. De Letelier
An act of state case with facts closely analogous to Liu is De Letelier
v. Republic of Chile 92 De Letelier arose from the murder in the United
States of Chilean dissident leader Orlando De Letelier. De Letelier's
widow brought suit in the United States against the Chilean government
for wrongful death, alleging that the murder of her husband had been
carried out with the aid and direction of Chile. The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that the act of state doctrine
did not shield the Chilean government from liability for a murder carried
out in this country-even though Chile's involvement in the scheme may
have occurred entirely within Chilean borders. The district court subse-
quently entered a twelve million dollar judgement against Chile.9 3
c. Filartiga
In Filartiga v. Pena Irala,94 a court again declined to apply the act of
state doctrine in a wrongful death suit. What is perhaps most striking
about this case is that it involved a murder which occurred in Paraguay.
Both the victim and the plaintiff were citizens of Paraguay. The act of
state doctrine was implicated because the defendant-Inspector General
of Police for the city of Asuncion-had apparently committed the mur-
der upon the express instruction of the government of Paraguay.
Despite the fact that it would be required to rule upon the propriety
of a government-ordered act, the United States District Court of New
York refused to dismiss the case. The court held that political murder is
"a 'clear and unambiguous' violation of the law of nations," 95 and that
"[w]here the principle of international law is as clear and universal as...
[here,]" the act of state doctrine has no application.96
92. 488 F. Supp 665 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
93. The DeLetelier plaintiff's victory may have been a pyrhic one; some eight years later
she is still attempting to collect the judgment, now with the aid of the United States State
Department. See U.S. Seeks $12 Million From Chile in '76 Death, San Francisco Chron., Oct.
13, 1988, at A-24, col. 1.
94. 577 F. Supp 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
95. Id at 862 (citation omitted).
96. Id. Based on this language in Filartiga, some commentators have argued for an excep-
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The more important point in Liu, however, is that the murder of
Henry Liu occurred in the United States-unlike the Filartiga murder-
and is thus a violation of United States law. Also unlike Filartiga, the
Liu murder victim and the plaintiff are both United States citizens.
Therefore, the Liu case implicates the substantial government interest in
providing a forum for a United States citizen to present her claim, arising
under American law, for a murder which occurred here.97 These United
States interests are absent in Filartiga. In this respect Liu presents an
even stronger case for non-application of the act of state doctrine. At the
very least, these are additional factors which, in the "balance of relevant
considerations," weigh heavily against application of the act of state doc-
trine in Liu. Again, however, one finds no mention of such factors in the
Liu decision.
d. Suarez-Mason
The only other reported act of state case involving a tort against the
person is Forti v. Suarez-Mason.98 In Suarez-Mason the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California was confronted
with facts almost identical to those present in the Filartiga case. Again
the act of state doctrine was held to be inapplicable. Refusing to dismiss
the case, the court noted that the plaintiff alleged "acts by a... [foreign]
government official in violation not of economic rights, but of fundamen-
tal human rights lying at the very heart of the individual's existence.
These are not the public official acts of a head of government. . .."99
De Letelier, Filartiga, and Suarez-Mason-the only reported act of
state cases involving murder by agents of a foreign sovereign-each ex-
press an absolute refusal to shield such misconduct under the act of state
tion to the act of state doctrine for cases in which the plaintiff alleges a "tort in violation of
international law." See eg., V. NANDA & D. PANsIus, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 101-03; see also
REsTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment e ("A claim arising
out of an alleged violation of fundamental human rights... would [if otherwise sustainable]
probably not be defeated by the act of state defense, since accepted international law of human
rights is both well established and contemplates external scrutiny of such acts."). The
Supreme Court has never endorsed such an exception, and indeed has held that the doctrine
does apply even if the plaintiff alleges that a foreign government action violated the interna.
tional law governing property expropriation. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398 (1964).
However, to the extent that it exists, the "Filartiga exception" would apparently apply In
the case.
97. For further discussion of the significance of situs in the case, see infra notes 111-16 and
accompanying text.
98. 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
99. Id. at 1546.
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doctrine. And Underhill, even if still good law, stands only for the prop-
osition that the act of state doctrine is applicable to non-violent torts that
are committed by the foreign sovereign within its own territory and that
have a colorable justification in terms of the sovereign's public policy
(e.g., completing construction of a public waterworks).
However, there is an additional factor in Liu which is not present in
any of the above cases; namely, a decision of the sovereign's courts allo-
cating responsibility for the tortious act. This fact is novel to the Liu
case. The question then becomes whether this distinction should make
any difference in terms of the act of state doctrine's applicability. As De
Letelier, Filartiga, and Suarez-Mason make clear, murder by a foreign
sovereign does not qualify as an act of state. By characterizing the
Taiwanese court proceedings as acts of state, should the Liu court in
effect protect the murder itself under the act of state doctrine?
As an initial matter, it must be noted that in no respect does this
additional factor (the Taiwanese court proceedings) diminish the special
policy concerns present in cases of violent tortious conduct by a foreign
sovereign. These factors were recognized in the De Letelier, Filartiga,
and Suarez-Mason cases and are equally present in Liu. In order for
these critical considerations to be overridden in the "balance of relevant
considerations," the Taiwanese court proceedings must present a com-
pelling case for application of the act of state doctrine. However, it will
be shown in the following discussion that such is not the case. Rather,
the case for application of the act of state doctrine to the Taiwanese court
proceeding is dubious at best.
2. The Taiwanese Court Proceeding at Issue In Liu Does Not
Constitute An Act of State
Not all acts of a foreign government constitute acts of state in the
technical sense of that term. Only those acts through which the sover-
eign has "exercise[d] its jurisdiction to give effect to its public inter-
ests"'"° are protected under the act of state doctrine. The Restatement
authors make clear that decisions of foreign courts are normally not acts
of state, because "court adjudication is not the usual way in which the
state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to its public interests." ' 1
Rather, the act of state doctrine is "directed to acts of general application
100. 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 41; cf. RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6,
1985, supra note 2, at § 469 (proposing instead the language "acts of a governmental
character").
101. 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 41 comment d.
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by the executive or legislative branches of the acting state." 102 In other
words, only the sovereign's attempts to make policy should be considered
acts of state.
There is one exception to the rule that court decisions are not acts of
state. In certain limited instances a foreign court adjudication will reflect
a sovereign policy decision, and thus will be a protected act of state.
However, the Restatement illustrations make clear the very narrow lim-
its of this exception. The exception encompasses adjudications such as
when the sovereign initiates court proceedings to obtain title by eminent
domain to property within its territory. 10 3  Restatement illustration 4
makes clear that an adjudication regarding tort liability "is not an act of
state within the meaning of [this] rule ....
Judge Lynch in Liu argues that the Taiwanese court proceedings fall
within the above exception because there was immense public concern
among the Taiwanese people regarding that government's involvement in
the Liu murder, and the court proceedings represent an attempt by the
Taiwanese government to "get to the bottom of the matter."10 5 How-
ever, this very rationale makes clear that the Taiwanese court proceed-
ings should not be deemed acts of state. According to Judge Lynch's
own reasoning, the Taiwanese court proceedings constituted an ostensi-
bly neutral, objective factfinding effort. Even accepting Judge Lynch's
characterization, the Taiwanese proceeding clearly is not an attempt by
the sovereign to make policy through adjudication. It is thus readily dis-
tinguishable from the Restatement's illustration of a protected court pro-
ceeding. Indeed an objective, neutral fact-finding effort is more akin to
the sort of "ministerial act" for which the courts have declined to apply
act of state protection.106 And insofar as the Taiwanese proceeding de-
termined liability for Liu's murder, it is closely analogous to Restatement
illustration 4-an example of a non-act of state adjudication. 107
Courts have held, for example, that a foreign sovereign's refusal to
compensate owners of expropriated property is a policy decision under
the act of state doctrine. It is thus beyond the review of United States
courts.10 8 A sovereign's action forcibly compelling a contractor to com-
102. RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 reporter's note 10.
103. 1965 RFSTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 41 comment d, illustration 6.
104. Id. at illustration 4.
105. Liu v. Republic of China, No. C-85-7461, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 1987).
106. See, eg., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum, Inc., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir 1979); V.
NANDA & D. PANslus, supra note 6, ch 10, at 19-20, 37 (discussing Alfred Dunhill of London,
Inc. v. The Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976)).
107. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
108. See, eg., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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plete a public-works project is also a decision protected by the doc-
trine, 109 as is a government's participation in a scheme of oil price-
fixing." 0
The common denominator in each of the above cases is the presence
of an attempt by the sovereign to institute policy through its action.
However, the governmental action in Liu is of a markedly different na-
ture than those described above. At issue in this case is the finding of a
Taiwanese court that its government was not involved in the murder of
Liu. This is a wholly factual determination, involving no policy-making
by the foreign sovereign; the Taiwanese government either sponsored the
murder of Liu, or it did not. Admittedly, this may be a complex and
difficult determination. But in any event, it is a determination as to
which questions of policy are wholly irrelevant. Nothing in the act of
state doctrine binds United States courts to such purely factual determi-
nations of foreign courts.
For the above reasons, the Liu court erred in its ruling that the
Taiwanese court proceeding constitutes an act of state. Clearly, the
above error mandates a reversal of the Liu decision. Since the Taiwanese
court proceeding does not constitute an act of state, there is no reason to
dismiss the case pursuant to the act of state doctrine.
However, even assuming that the court proceeding is arguably an
act of state, this does not end the inquiry. Merely because an act of a
foreign government qualifies as an "act of state" for purposes of the act
of state doctrine does not automatically mean that act is protected under
the doctrine. Only if certain additional criteria are met will qualifying
acts of state be insulated from scrutiny by United States courts. As will
be seen in the following section, such criteria are not satisfied in the Liu
case.
3. The Taiwanese Court Adjudication Does Not Come to
Complete Fruition within the Territory of Taiwan
The act of state doctrine does not insulate all acts of state from
United States judicial scrutiny. Indeed, one such limitation is found
within the very definition of the doctrine: "[Tihe courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory."' 1 Courts have interpreted this limitation to
109. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
110. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cerL de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
111. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added); accord RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No.
6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 reporter's note 4.
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mean that only those acts of state which "come to complete fruition
within the dominion of the [foreign] government"'1 12 will be protected
under the doctrine.
The underlying rationale of the act of state doctrine is "a common
sense one.... [W]hen the foreign sovereign has the parties and the res
before it and acts in such a manner as to change the: relationship between
the parties touching the res . ..there [is] nothing the United States
Courts [can] do about it in any event.""' 3 When the above situation does
not exist, the sovereign will not be "physically in a position to perform a
fait accompli," I 4 and therefore the argument for application of the act of
state doctrine loses much of its force:
The obvious inability of a foreign state to complete an... [act of state]
beyond its borders reduces the foreign state's expectations of domin-
ion.... Consequently, the potential for offense to the foreign state is
reduced, there is less danger that the judicial disposition.., will 'vex
the peace of nations,' and there is less need for judicial deference to the
foreign affairs competence of the other branches of government.is
The Liu court clearly was not faced with afait accompli by Taiwan.
The Taiwan government has no dejure authority to bind the plaintiff in a
United States court, nor even the ability to alter her defacto relationship
to the disputed res (i.e., the tort debt). The Taiwanese court proceedings
can bind the Liu plaintiff in her United States civil suit only if the United
States courts so acquiesce. In this sense, the Taiwanese act of state can
be'completed only through United States cooperation; since the murder
of Liu was committed in the United States, our courts have jurisdiction
to hear the widow's claim. Therefore the Taiwanese adjudication was
not an act "done within" the territory of Taiwan; thus application of the
act of state doctrine is not mandated in the Liu case.
Rather, United States courts have held that an incomplete act of
state-one which requires acquiescence of the United States government
in order to bind the plaintiff-is protected under the act of state doctrine
only if such act is "consistent with [United Statesl policy and laws."'1 16
In other words, extraterritorial acts of state will not be recognized when
112. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A. v. Standard Cigar Co., 392 F.2d 706, 715-16 (5th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924 (1968). An act which requires the acquiescence of an-
other country in order to be "fully executed" is not due protection under the act of state
doctrine. See 1965 RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, at § 43.
113. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
114. Tabacalera Severiano Jorge, S.A., 392 F2d. at 715.
115. Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021, 1028..29 (5th Cir. 1972) (citations
omitted), cert denied, 409 U.S. 1060 (1972).
116. Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1965) (footnote
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contrary to United States policy. As will be seen in the following discus-
sion, binding the Liu plaintiff by the findings of the Taiwanese courts is
not consistent with United States policy and law.
4. Binding the Liu Plaintiff by the Taiwanese Court Proceedings
is Inconsistent with United States Policy and Law
a. Comity and Due Process
As explicitly expressed in our law of comity, United States policy
forbids binding a person by the judgement of a foreign court unless that
person was given notice and an opportunity to be heard in the context of
a full and fair hearing.117 To bind a person by a foreign judgement ren-
dered in the absence of such guarantees amounts to a denial of due pro-
cess. 118 Therefore, our courts are "unwilling to accept such judgments
without full scrutiny."'1 9
The Liu plaintiff was never given any notice that the Taiwanese pro-
ceedings would be determinative of her rights as a tort victim in the
United States. Furthermore, 'she alleges that those proceedings were
neither full nor fair.'2 Therefore, United States policy as expressed in
our law of comity requires-at a minimum-that United States courts
carefully scrutinize the fairness of the Taiwanese proceedings before
binding the Liu plaintiff by them. In giving extraterritorial effect to the
Liu act of state, Judge Lynch made such scrutiny impossible. Therefore,
recognition of this extraterritorial act of state violates United States pol-
icy as expressed in our laws of comity and due process.
b. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
There is another respect in which recognition of the Taiwanese
court proceedings violates United States policy and law. Section
1605(a)(5) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act' 2 ' specifically pro-
vides for jurisdiction in United States courts over foreign governments
omitted), cert denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966). See also 1965 RESTAT.MENT, supra note 5, at
§ 46.
117. V. NANDA & D. PANsius, supra note 6, ch. 11, at 5.
118. Id.
119. RESTATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469, reporter's note 10.
120. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
121. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)-(c), 1332(a)(4),
1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1976)). Section 1605(a)(5) provides in part- "A foreign state shall
not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case
... in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death...
occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign
state...
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for personal injury or death committed by them in the United States.
Therefore, this law evinces an explicit, unambiguous public policy in
favor of providing a United States forum for plaintiffs to sue foreign gov-
ernments in cases such as Liu. Applying the act of state doctrine so as to
dismiss the Liu plaintiff's claim "totally emasculate(s) the purpose and
effectiveness of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act .... -122
Indeed Congress, one of the "political" branches to which deference
is due under the act of state doctrine, has explicitly stated its belief that
the doctrine should never be applied to bar a claim for which there is
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 123 A plurality
of the Supreme Court has accepted this absolute rule.124 Similarly, the
lower courts have been reluctant to apply the act of state doctrine so as
to dismiss a case for which there is clear statutory grant of
jurisdiction. 125
c. The Wrongful Death Acts
Today wrongful death statutes exist in all fifty states and in various
forms at the federal level. Collectively, these statutes evidence a policy
which the Liu court ignores. The Supreme Court has interpreted these
statutes as "establish[ing] [a] policy carr[ying] significance beyond the
particular scope of each of the statutes involved," and thus "eviden[cing]
a wide rejection by the legislatures" of any common law barriers to re-
covery in wrongful death cases. 126 Mr. Justice Holmes recognized that
wrongful death statutes "may imply a policy different from that of the
common law, and therefore may exclude a reference to the common law
for the purpose of limiting their scope."' 127
122. De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665, 674 (D.D.C. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
123. Congress has said that the act of state doctrine should not be applied so as to allow
"sovereign immunity to reenter through the back door." H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 20, n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. COD CONG. & ADMIN. Nilws 6604, 6619.
124. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), (the
Court declined to apply the act of state doctrine in a case for which there was jurisdiction
under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). But see International Ass'n of Machinists v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing act of state doctrine to bar adjudication of a
claim for which the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1982).
125. See eg., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per
curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring), cerL denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) ("[To cite the [act of
state] doctrine's rationale as broad justification for effectively nullifying a statutory grant of
jurisdiction, is, to my view, an inappropriate exercise of... court power.").
126. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970).
127. Panama R. Co. v. Rock, 266 U.S. 209, 216 (1924) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
[Vol, 12
Act of State Doctrine in Wrongful Death Suits
The Liu court's broad application of the act of state doctrine comes
at the expense of the substantial policies which, according to the
Supreme Court, are evidenced in wrongful death statutes. In applying
the common law act of state doctrine so as to thwart recovery for wrong-
ful death, the Liu court fails to heed the Supreme Court's admonition
that the broad policies evidenced by wrongful death acts supersede any
contrary provisions of the common law.
As is made clear above, the Liu act of state cannot come to fruition
so as to bind the plaintiff without the acquiescence of the United States
government. The Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that such acts
of state are protected under the act of state doctrine only if consistent
with United States policy and law. However, binding the plaintiff by the
Liu act of state violates United States policy as evidenced by our laws of
comity, due process, and foreign sovereign immunity. The decision also
thwarts the substantial legislative policies underlying the wrongful death
acts, despite the Supreme Court's admonition that such acts be construed
as broadly superseding the common law. Therefore, the Liu court
clearly erred in extending act of state protection to the Taiwanese
adjudications.
5. The Liu Court Fails to Appreciate the Rationale Underlying
the Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a flexible rule,128 which should be applied
in light of the policies underlying the doctrine. 29 Recall that the act of
state doctrine is most accurately seen as based upon a recognition of the
separation of powers within the federal government.13 1 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has said that the doctrine's "vitality depends on its ca-
pacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial
and political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon for-
eign affairs." 131 There are two distinct ways in which the doctrine ad-
dresses separation of powers concerns. First, the doctrine recognizes
that under our system of government the executive is more competent
than the judiciary to make certain foreign policy decisions.1 32  Second,
the doctrine seeks to avoid the embarrassment to the executive branch
which would result from judicial interference with the executive's man-
128. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972).
129. RFSrATEMENT Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985, supra note 2, at § 469 comment b.
130. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
131. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964).
132. See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
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agement of foreign policy.133 However, none of these concerns are pres-
ent in the Liu case. Therefore, as the following discussion makes clear,
application of the act of state doctrine to the Liu facts furthers none of
the policies underlying the doctrine.
a. The Judiciary is Fully Competent to Reach a Decision in Liu
The court in Sabbatino noted that-unlike murder-the govern-
mental expropriation of property is not governed by neutral principles
supported by a consensus of international opinion. Rather, the issue of
property expropriation is inseparably bound-up with the political ideol-
ogy of the acting state.134 Therefore, application of the act of state doc-
trine was held to be appropriate in that case.
However, the central issue posed by the Liu litigation-namely,
whether the Taiwanese government was involved in the decedent's mur-
der-is entirely a question offact, requiring no policy determinations for
its resolution."3 As such, the issue is well within the province of the
courts. Indeed, such factual findings are at the very core of the judicial
function. The courts have developed detailed and comprehensive proce-
dures within the adversarial system for promoting the reliability of its
factual determinations.
Furthermore, the legal standards to be applied in the Liu case are
well-established and unambiguous, and thus do not require the court to
engage in the unguided policy-making of a political question case. Con-
duct involving wrongful death is governed by definite principles of both
international and domestic law, with which the courts regularly deal.
Similarly, the recognition of foreign judgments (such as the Taiwanese
court proceedings) is a matter of the law of comity traditionally within
the province of the courts. These are well-settled areas of the law, the
adjudication of which is thus unlikely to "touch... sharply on national
nerves .... ,136
Therefore, insofar as the Liu case allows the court to "focus on the
application of agreed principle[s] to circumstances of fact rather than the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the na-
tional interest or international justice,"1 37 there is no reason to apply the
133. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
134. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-30 ("There are few if any issues in international law today
on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's power to expropriate the
property of aliens.") (footnote omitted).
135. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
136. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
137. Id.
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act of state doctrine. The courts are at least as competent to handle such
situations as the executive branch.
The act of state doctrine requires only "that the courts defer to the
legislative and executive branches when those branches are better
equipped to resolve... [the] question."13 Thus the Supreme Court in
Sabbatino held that the act of state doctrine is most properly applied to
cases involving a general expropriation by a foreign government affecting
a large number of persons. In such a situation, the act of state is "of so
broad a nature as to be beyond the competency of the courts to afford
relief.....- 139 The State Department is then best able to represent the
interests of all claimants en masse through diplomatic channels, thus
avoiding the problems associated with resolution of the matter through
piecemeal litigation in the courts.
This is quite unlike the Liu situation. In Liu the foreign sovereign's
act is not one of general policy, but rather is a limited, focused action
affecting specific parties-all of whom were before the United States dis-
trict court. The courts are clearly more competent to pursue such iso-
lated claims, the executive branch being designed to address broader,
policy disputes. Indeed, commentators have specifically noted that "[ilt
is doubtful the executive branch would be capable of obtaining compen-
sation for a plaintiff for the wrongful death of their relative.""'t4 There-
fore, given the superior competence of the courts to handle such limited,
focused disputes, the act of state doctrine has no proper application
here. 14'
b. The Liu Case Presents No Risk of Interference with the
Executive Function
There is little chance that judicial resolution of the Liu case would
"interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political
branches."' 42 Indeed, the Liu murder has yet to be the subject of any
such negotiations. Nor is it likely to be so subject, given the isolated
nature of the occurrence. "The executive branch lacks the personnel and
time to seek relief for all private persons injured by [isolated acts of for-
eign sovereigns]."' 43
138. International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981) (em-
phasis added), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
139. V. NANDA & D. PANsius, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 38.
140. Id at 102.
141. Id. at 56.
142. First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 775-76 (1972),
(Powell, J., concurring).
143. V. NANDA & D. PANsIus, supra note 6, ch. 10, at 25.
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Therefore, it is highly unlikely that judicial resolution of the Liu
matter would cause the sort of interference or embarrassment to the ex-
ecutive branch which the act of state doctrine aims to avoid. Where, as
here, "judicial abstention is [not] required in order to avoid interference
with the political branches' conduct of foreign relations," the case for
application of the act of state doctrine loses much of its force.144
III. CONCLUSION
Although the history of the act of state doctrine is marked by confu-
sion and inconsistency, several important concepts nevertheless clearly
emerge from the modem Supreme Court decisions in the field. Perhaps
most importantly, the modem cases demonstrate a shift in the rationale
of the doctrine away from antiquated notions of the "inherent nature of
sovereign authority." As a matter of domestic-not international-law,
the doctrine is more correctly seen as concerned with ordering the proper
relationships between branches of government in a system of separated
powers.
As Sabbatino makes clear, application of the act of state doctrine is
not "compelled" in any given case. Rather, the doctrine should be ap-
plied to dismiss the plaintiff's claim only in those cases which are, for
one reason or another, more appropriately and effectively resolved by
executive diplomacy than by litigation. Judicial intervention into sensi-
tive foreign policy disputes would likely thwart efforts to secure compen-
sation for the plaintiff through diplomatic channels. Furthermore, the
executive branch might experience international embarrassment should
the court's resolution of the dispute conflict with official State Depart-
ment policy.
Understood in this light, the doctrine's misapplication at the hands
of the Liu court becomes manifest. The primary issues raised by the Liu
claim are ones with which the judiciary is both familiar and competent.
The courts have developed clear and well-settled standards for determin-
ing whether a foreign adjudication is binding in United States courts. As
well, wrongful death claims have traditionally been the province of the
judiciary-not the executive.
The foreign governmental act giving rise to this suit-an assassina-
tion-is an event so isolated in nature as to affect only the Liu plaintiff.
144. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1534 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 406 U.S. 759, 775-76 (1972) (Powell, 1,
concurring), vacated on other grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); Texas Trading and Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316, n.38 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1148 (1982).
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There is no danger here of "piecemeal litigation" injurious to the inter-
ests of non-party plaintiffs, which would call for representation en masse
by the State Department. Indeed cases involving isolated tort claims, as
in Liu, are unlikely to be championed by the State Department given its
limited time and resources. Also, since the executive branch is not cur-
rently involved in this case-nor is future executive involvement foresee-
able-there can be no concern that judicial resolution of the matter will
interfere with any "delicate negotiations" of the executive, or cause that
branch any embarrassment.
These objections aside, it is seriously questionable whether the
Taiwanese proceedings constitute an act of state in the technical sense of
that term. Only the sovereign's attempts to makepolicy are to be consid-
ered acts of state. Decisions of foreign courts are not acts of state, except
in the very unusual circumstance when the sovereign has acted through
its courts to institute public policy. As a purportedly neutral, objective
fact-finding effort, the Taiwanese proceedings clearly do not meet this
criterion.
Even if we assume that the Taiwanese adjudication does constitute
an act of state, it is immunized from United States judicial scrutiny by
the act of state doctrine only if the act comes to "complete fruition"
within the territory of Taiwan. In that case, the United States courts
would be faced with afait accompli by the Taiwanese government. How-
ever, this is clearly not the case in Liu. Since the United States courts
have jurisdiction over the case, the plaintiff can be bound by the
Taiwanese act only if the United States courts acquiesce.
It is a well-settled rule that United States courts should acquiesce in
giving extraterritorial effect to an otherwise incomplete act of state only
if that act is consistent with United States policy and law. However, to
bind the Liu plaintiff by the Taiwanese adjudication is clearly inconsis-
tent with United States policy as expressed in the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act, the laws of comity and due process, and the wrongful
death statutes.
Finally, in applying the act of state doctrine to shield a foreign sov-
ereign from civil liability for murder, the Liu court ignores the recent
precedent of De Letelier, Filartiga, and Suarez-Mason. These cases uni-
formly decline to apply the act of state doctrine in wrongful death suits.
Such intentional torts against the person raise special policy concerns-
long recognized at common law-which, in the Sabbatino "balance of
relevant considerations," weigh heavily against immunizing Taiwan from
liability under the act of state doctrine.
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that the district court has
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seriously misapplied the act of state doctrine. Indeed, it has stood the
law on its head. What is meant as a rule for determining the channels
best suited to seek compensation for the plaintiff, has become in the
hands of the Liu court a grievous instrument of injustice with support
neither in case law nor reason.
